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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
KENNECOTT CO RPO RAT ION, 
KENNECOTT MI NE RA LS COMP ANY 
DIVISION, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and Rose K. Georgas, 
Widow of Alex Demetrios 
Georg as, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Case No. 19036 
I. STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a proceeding to review the lawfulness of an 
award by the Industrial Commission of Utah to the dependents of 
Alex De me trios Georg as, deceased. 
II. DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
On November 18, 1982 Administrative Law Judge 
hy c. Allen issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
1nd Utuer granting benefits to the dependents of Alex Demetrios 
Georgas in Claim No. 82001754. The Order was affirmed by u,,. 
Industrial Commission on February 2, 1983. nn March 4, 
plaintiff filed this action with the Supreme Court of Utuli 
III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation, seeks to have the 
Order issued by the Industrial Commission through its Adminis-
trative Law Judge on November 18, 1982, and affirmed by the 
Commission on February 2, 1983, set aside in its entirety. The 
arguments and authorities in support of plaintiff's request for 
relief are set forth in Plaintiff's Brief heretofore filed in 
this action on April 22, 1983. 
This Reply Brief is in response to contentions, argu-
ments and authorities set forth in the Brief of Defendant 
Rose K. Georgas which was filed with this Court on May 23, 1983. 
IV. BACKGROUND FACTS 
The basic facts necessary to the determination of this 
controversy are essentially those set forth in Plaintiff's 
Brief (pp. 3-5) and are not in dispute except for alleged dif-
ferences noted in the Brief of Defendant Rose K. Georgas. such 
differences--even if established--are not of material signifi-
cance insofar as the basic positions of the parties are con-
cerned. Plaintiff's position with respect to such dlfference 0 
and to the legal principles of Utah Workmen's Compensation Ja .. 
-2-
ied to the acknowledged facts of this controversy are 
, 11, in the Argument portion of this Reply Brief. 
V. STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. UNDER THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AS CON-
SJSTENTLY INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT, THERE IS NO INFERENCE OR 
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY; THE BURDEN IS UPON THE CLAIMANT 
TO ESTABLISH THE COMPENSABILITY OF THE INJURY OR DEATH. 
2. CONTRARY TO THE CONTENTION OF DEFENDANT, THE 
CLAIMANT MUST SHOW A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEDENT'S 
Et1PLOYMENT DUTIES WITH PLAINTIFF AND HIS DEATH AT THE NO. 9 
TANK ON PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES. 
3. THE ONLY REASONABLE CONCLUSION FROM THE EVIDENCE 
Iii THE RECORD IS THAT DECEDENT'S DEATH AT THE NO. 9 SETTLING 
!ANK WAS NOT CAUSUALLY RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT DUTIES. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. UNDER THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AS CON-
SISTENTLY INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT, THERE IS NO INFERENCE OR 
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY; THE BURDEN IS UPON THE CLAIMANT 
TO ESTABLISH THE COMPENSABILITY OF THE INJURY OR DEATH. 
The main thrust of defendant's argument--despite her 
deta i 1 ed overemphasis of the wel !-acknowledged and, in this 
,3se 1 irrelevant, between •course of employment• 
'" 1 'M ising out of employment"--is that there is or should be 
-3-
--
an inference or presulllption of compensabilily where the 
takes place on the premises of the employer during tlie wun, 1, 
hours of the decedent employee. She further asserts that 
under such circumstances relieves her from her burden of proot 
to establish all tlie elements of compensability in this case. 
such contentions are contrary to established Utah Workmen's 
Compensation law. There is no presumption or inference of com-
pensability, either by statutory provision or by court deci-
sions, in the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant has 
referred to no language in the statute, and there is none, 
which specifies or even suggests a presumption of compensabil-
ity. Nor has defendant referred to any decisions of this Court 
in support of such contentions. Instead she has asked the 
acceptance by this Court of Professor Larson's "theory• which 
presumes that an unexplained death occurring on the premises 
during working hours is work related because "death has removed 
the only possible witness who could prove causal connection.' 
That theory has not been, nor should it now be, accepted as 
applicable to the Utah Workmen's compensation Act. It was 
rejected by the Court of Appeals of Oregon in the Matter of 
Raines, Or. App., 585 P.2d 721 (1978) with the following lan-
guage which is appropriate also to this case: 
Compensation for injury or death of a worker 
is created by statute. We decline to amend 
the Act by adjusting the statutory burden of 
proof through a judicially created presump-
tion. 
-4-
1, Workmen's Compensation Act, like the Oregon Act, 
11ability upon the employer regardless of fault and 
, 11 ,, 11 k e the Oregon Act, consistently and uniformly has been 
1 nterpt eted to place the burden of proof upon the claimant to 
establish all the elements of compensability. 
As stated in Plaintiff's Brief (pp 6-11) this Court 
consistently has held that the claimant has the burden of proof 
to establish entitlement to compensation benefits, including 
the burden of showing the causal relationship of the duties of 
employment to the unexpected injury or death which occurred. 
In Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 ( 1969), the Court stated: 
The claimant has not met the onus of proving 
an •accident• in the course of his employ-
ment that "caused" the "injury• of which he 
complained, WhICh burden is his. 454 P.2d 
at 285 (emphasis added). 
And further: 
To conclude otherwise would insure every 
truck driver, every railroad engineer, every 
airplane pilot, and a lot of others, against 
the physiological malfunction or physical 
collapse of any of hundreds of human organs, 
completely unproven as to cause, but com-
pensable only by virtue of the happenstance 
that the malfunction, collapse or injury 
occurred while the employee was on the job, 
and not at home or elsewhere. 454 P.2d at 
28 5. 
The above language was referred to by this Court as recently as 
1.1,1uary, 1982 in sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, Utah, 642 
-5-
P.2d 722. The Court reaffirmed its definition and reguirem<>ni 
for a compensable "accident• under the terms of the Utah v<u, 1 
men's Compensation Act, saying that 
does not ipso facto mean that a 
"the mere showing of inJur, 
compensable accident has 
occurred." The Court cited such recent decisions as Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission and 
Thurman, Utah, 590 P.2d 328 (1979) and Farmers Grain Co-op v. 
Mason, Utah, 606 P.2d 237 (1980) and stated once again that the 
applicant bears the burden of showing the causal relationshie 
of his duties of employment to the unexpected injury which 
occurred. (Sabo case, 642 P.2d at 726). 
In summary, it is clear from the cases submitted 
above, as well as from the language of the Utah Workmen's 
pensation statute, that defendant's reliance upon a presumption 
or inference of compensability in this case is untenable. It 
has no support in the language of the statute and in effect has 
been rejected by this Court, as indicated in the cases set 
forth above and others too numerous to mention. This Court 
consistently has held, as Chief Justice Hall clearly outlined 
in his opinion in Sabo, that there must be an •identifiable 
accident• and further that the claimant must establish proof of 
the causal relationship of the duties of the employment to the 
injury or death. 
-6-
2. CONTRARY TO THE CONTENTION OF DEFENDANT, THE 
,, ,, 1 MUST SHOW A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEDENT'S 
,,, 1,»YMEl<'l' DUTIES WITH PLAINTIFF AND HIS DEATH AT THE NO. 9 
,FTTLING TANK ON PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES. 
Defendant has asserted repeatedly in her brief that 
she is not required to show a causal relationship between dece-
dent's death at the No. 9 settling tank of plaintiff and the 
of decedent's employment. Such assertion flies in the 
face of the specific language found in the Sabo decision that: 
The accident must result in an injury which 
is causally related to the work being 
642 P.2d at 725. (Emphasis added). 
And further: 
Proof of the causal relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is 5I1iiPIY 
lacking. 642 P.2d at 726. (Emphasis added). 
above requirement of causal relationship between the injury 
or death and the work being done was reconfirmed by this Court 
in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory & Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Keller, Utah, 657 P.2d 1367 at 1370 (1983) with the follow-
ing language: 
our comment in Sabo concerning a back injury 
is equally applicable to the questions 
generated by Mr. Keller's heart disease: 
The accident must result in an injury 
which is causally related to the work 
being done. The mere showing of injury 
does not ipso facto mean that a com-
pensable accident has occurred. 
(Emphasis added). 
-7-
The cases mentioned above definitely cnniir 111 
requirement of compensability that there must be a causul ., 
tionship between the injury or death on the one hand arid ti", 
duties of employment or the work being done on the other. 
Therefore, defendant's contention that there need be no suer 
causal connection with employment duties is erroneous and con-
trary to established Utah Workmen's Compensation law. 
Another erroneous and unsupported assumption in defen-
dant's brief on the important issue of causal relationship and 
employment duties is her insistence that plaintiff has consi-
dered only the direct employment duties in its causal relation-
ship argument. Nothing is further from the truth. Kennecott 
has acknowledged from the beginning of this controversy anc 
indeed has specifically recognized in Plaintiff's Brief on file 
with this Court (pp. 12, 13 and 20) that for purposes of com-
pensability under the Utah Act, the duties of employment 
include not only the direct and primary duties of the assigned 
job but also those things which are reasonably necessary and 
incidental thereto. 
recognized this now 
Kennecott has specifically referred to and 
well-established principle of Workmen's 
Compensation Law as found in such cases as Hafer' s Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 526 P.2d 1188 ( 1974) where affir-
mative evidence showed that the assigned duties of the d['! I' 
cant traveling salesman included as incidental thereto keef J(,. 
-8-
a safe and sufficient running condition. 
- 1, t'lainti ff, the Court stated as follows: 
tl<"Vertheless, the scope of one's employment 
includes not only those things which are the 
direct and primary duties of the assigned 
job but also those things which are reason-
ably necessary and incidental 
P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added). 
As noted 
However, Kennecott has pointed out also that there is 
a distinction between activities which are considered "inciden-
cal' to an employee's employment and those which are not. Such 
" distinction was made clearly and meaningfully by the Court in 
Rowley v. Industrial Commission, 15 Utah 2d 330, 392 P.2d 1016 
(1964). In that case the Court held that a real estate sales-
man was not acting in the course of his employment when he left 
the house that he had sold and proceeded to help the purchaser 
free his automobile which was stuck in the snow. This was so 
even though he had been within the course of his employment 
when checking the utilities of the house a few moments before. 
Plaintiff also has recognized the application of the 
rationale of United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah, 613 
P.2d 508 (1980) in which running to the possible assistance of 
d fellow employee, as established by affirmative evidence in 
thP record, was found to be "reasonably expected" of and thus 
'1111 idental • to the employment duties. This rationale was 
'' 1 as found in Plaintiff's Brief (p. 21)--by this 
,_,urt in the recent case of J & w Janitorial Co. v. Industrial 
-9-
commission, Utah, 661 P.2d 949 (1983). There i t was h P 1 <I " 
decedent's activities on the employer's premises were ti 
things an employee "reasonably could be expected to do in cr_q,. 
nection with work duties• and, therefore, the Industrial c01,__ 
mission award was an unreasonable and improper expansion by the 
commission of the scope and/or course of employment duties 
within the contemplation of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Defendant has cited Professor Larson's treatise in 
support of her position. Yet even Professor Larson at the very 
beginning of Chapter IV on Course of Employment makes it clear 
that the activity in question must have a purpose related to 
the employment in order for the injury to be considered as hav-
ing arisen in the course of employment. He states as follows 
in Section 14.00: 
An injury is said to arise in the course of 
the employment when it takes place within 
the period of employment at a place where 
the employee reasonably may be and while he 
is fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing 
something incidental thereto. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
And further: 
The course of employment requirement tests 
work-connection as to time, place and act i-
vity; That is, it demands that the injury 
be shown to have arisen within the time and 
space boundaries of the employment, and in 
the course of an activity whose purpose is 
related to the employment. 
In summary, it was claimant's burden in this case l, 
prove that decedent's death was causally related to the dutieo__ 
-10-
with plaintiff and to do so claimant must 
i ,,1 d"cedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank was 
necessary and incidental to his employment duties. 
3. THE ONLY REASONABLE CONCLUSION FROM THE EVIDENCE 
Ul THE RECORD IS THAT DECEDENT'S DEATH AT THE NO. 9 SETTLING 
TANK WAS NOT CAUSALLY RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT DUTIES. 
The basic issue in this case is whether or not there 
15 substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of 
the Industrial Commission, that decedent's death at the No. 9 
settling tank of Kennecott was causally related to his employ-
ment duties. 
Plaintiff is aware of the many authorities defining 
the scope of review in Industrial Commission cases, including 
the most recent decisions of this Court with respect to the 
limitations of its inquiry in Workmen's Compensation matters. 
We are aware also, as this Court stated in the Sabo case that 
the inquiry is limited to: 
whether the Commission's findings are 
'arbitrary or capricious,' or 'wholly with-
out cause' or contrary to the 'one [ inevit-
able] conclusion from the evidence' or with-
out 'any substantial evidence' to support 
them. Only then should the Commission's 
findings be displaced. 
These inquiry limitations were reiterated and reaffirmed by 
l\1i s Court through Justice Durham in the recent case of Ogden 
-11-
standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission, case no. 1,, 
Apr i 1 2 0, 19 8 3. 
Plaintiff's position in this case is wholly cons1blln• 
with the principles and the intent of the language set forti, 
above. It is plaintiff's contention that the claimant in this 
case, as a matter of law, did not sustain her burden to show 
the requisite causal relationship between decedent's death at 
the No. 9 settling tank and his employment duties, either pri-
mary or incidental. Therefore, as Justice Howe stated in the 
J & W Janitorial case: 
We acknowledge the recognized rule of con-
struction which resolves any doubt regarding 
compensation in favor of recovery. McPbie 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah 567 P.2d 153 
( 197 7) and, we are mindful of the deference 
this Court gives the Industrial Commission's 
decisions on review. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Manfredi, Utah 631 P.2d 888 (1981). None-
theless, the onl reasonable conclusion from 
the evidence here was t at decedent 
was not killed in an accident which arose 
•out of or in the course of employment.• 
661 P.2d at 951. (emphasis added). 
It was defendant's burden to supply the required 
causal nexus between decedent's employment duties and his pre-
sence at the No. 9 settling tank. No evidence was produced by 
defendant or referred to by the Administrative Law Judge or the 
Commission to explain decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling 
tank or to causally connect it with his employment duties, 
either primary or incidental. The evidence is undispute:,, 
indeed acknowledged by defendant, that none of decedent's wor· 
-12-
1 ripper operator required or involved in any way his 
,1 the No. 9 settling tank where he was found. (see 
,.,,,,] also R. 110, 112). Therefore, it was incumbent upon 
lefe 1,dci11t_ to show a reasonable "incidental" work relationship 
t,et:ween decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank and his 
"Dlf'loyment duties as was found in the Hafer's case (526 P.2d at 
Jl89) or that decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank 
would be one of "those things which it should reasonably be 
expected an employee would do in connection with those [work] 
duties• as was found in the Draper case. (613 P.2d 508, 509). 
in both of those cases affirmative evidence by the claimant 
pro'.'lded the •reasonably expected" or •reasonably incidental" 
causal connection between the work duties and the injury or 
death. 
In this case, no reasonable expectation or explanation 
of any kind was advanced by defendant or the Commission to 
account for decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank. 
This was acknowledged by counsel for defendant (R. 212): 
.•• it is nothing more than speculation to 
say that decedent went to the old operations 
center to get a drink; in any event, that 
would not explain why he went to the No. 9 
pond. 
uefendant has made no effort to present evidence which would 
11n11e<'r in any w"ty decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling 
iLh his employment duties or which would qualify for com-
l'er coat ion under the rationale of the Draper case as one of 
-13-
"those things which it should reasonably be Pxpect <'rl 
employee would do in connection with those [work l rJut ic· 
Instead she has relied upon the "course of employment" ar•1u1:,,, 11 , 
which she has asserted dispenses with the requirement of llie 
causal connection between the decedent's death and his employ-
ment duties so long as decedent's "accident" caused his dean 
while he was still employed on the premises of plaintiff. See 
defendant's brief, p. 12. 
As mentioned above, that contention is contrary to 
Utah Workmen's Compensation law as consistently interpreted by 
the decisions of this Court. It is not enough that an identi-
fiable accident occurred which resulted in the injury or death 
complained of. As stated by Justice Hall in the Sabo decision 
(642 P.2d at 725) and again by Justice Durham speaking for a 
unanimous court in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory & Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Keller, Utah, 657 P.2d 1367 at 1370 
( 198 3): 
The accident must result in an injury which 
is causally related to the work being done. 
The mere showing of injury does not ipso 
facto mean that a compensable accident has 
occurred. 
In summary, it was defendant's burden to show thal 
decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank where he died 
was in some causal fashion "incidental" to his work 
employment duties, or that his death at the No. 9 settling tanl. 
-14-
., .. a result of his having engaged in one of "those 
1,1cl. it should reasonably be expected an employee would 
l' cnnnection with [work) duties.• No evidence was 
, .. , or referred to by defendant to show that crucial 
causal nexus in this case. Therefore, defendant has failed to 
sJstain her burden to establish the elements of a compensable 
accident. 
Although it was the claimant's burden to establish the 
elements of compensability in this case, plaintiff nevertheless 
affirmatively produced evidence which showed that there was no 
causal relationship whatever between decedent's activities or 
presence at the No. 9 settling tank and his work or employment 
duties, either primary or incidental. Plaintiff's evidence 
shows (R. 132) that decedent's body was found in the No. 9 
settling tank (Exhibit D-2, Area No. 9) which is inaccessible 
by any direct route from decedent's precipitation plant tripper 
'perator work station (R. 126, 127; see also, Exhibit D-3, 
"· 186). The two locations are separated by a 10 foot cement 
wall, several railroad tracks and a ditch and steep embank-
ment. (R. 127 and 128). The No. 9 tank is also far removed 
from and is not passed, traversed or connected with decedent's 
travel route to or from the parking lot (Area 1, Exhibit D-2), 
ur from his change room or lunchroom (Area 2, Exhibit D-2) 
n to 1 i r 
'.xi. i bit 
from his area of work activities 
D-2) . Plaintiff's evidence also 
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(Areas 3, 4 and 5, 
showed, without any 
controversy by defendant, that none of decedent's dut i •·. 
tr i ppe r operator r eq u ired or i n v o 1 v e d i n any way Ii is pre , '" 
at the No. 9 settling tank where he was found. (See R. 130 "' 
also R. 110, 112). 
Defendant's Brief ( p. 9) suggests the availability of 
drinking water at the old operations center (Exhibit 2, Area 8) 
as an employment-related reason for decedent's presence at the 
No. 9 settling tank. such suggestion is completely 
inconsistent with defendant's earlier acknowledgment (R. 212) 
that: 
• it is nothing more than speculation to 
say that the decedent went to the old opera-
tions center to get a drink; in any event, 
that would not explain why he went to the 
No. 9 pond. 
Thus, even assuming the validity of the unsupported conjecture 
that decedent left the lunchroom (Exhibit 2, Area 2) and went 
to the old operations center (Exhibit 2, Area 8) to get a drink 
of water, even defendant has admitted that it would not provide 
any employment related explanation for decedent's presence at 
the No. 9 settling tank where he was found. Plaintiff's uncon-
troverted evidence is that the No. 9 settling tank is 200 yards 
away from the old operations center and in the opposite 
traveled direction from decedent's work station or any of his 
other employment related activities. (R. 12 6). Plaintiff'' 
evidence also showed (Ex. D-4, D-5 and R. 129) that the 20l, 
yard walkway from the old operations plant (Ex. D-2, Area 81 to 
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:,et t 1 inq tank is not only narrow but contains 
!,,Hards and obstructions. 
The above evidence, uncontroverted in the record, 
siiuWb affirmatively that decedent's presence at the No. 9 
celtling tank was not and could not in any reasonable way be 
characterized as one of "those things which it should reason-
ably be expected an employee would do in connection with those 
;work] duties" in order to qualify for compensation under the 
case rationale referred to in defendant's Brief. 
In summary, not only is the record devoid of any evi-
dence showing a causal connection between decedent's death at 
the No. 9 settling tank and his employment duties with plain-
tiff, it contains direct testimony and exhibits specifically 
negatinq any such causal relationship. This Court has set 
forth in Hafer' s and in Draper the course of employment causal 
connection requirements for compensability under the Utah Work 
Compensation Act. Defendant has failed completely to sustain 
ner burden of proof to satisfy such requirements. Under such 
circumstances, the only reasonable conclusion from the record 
evidence here is that decedent was not killed by accident aris-
in3 •out of or in the course of his employment• within the con-
:.,mpL•t ion of the language or the intent of the Utah Workmen's 
1:l1F ..T1sation Act. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The legal issues in this casce hav"" t''"'"n , I· 
defined. Both defendant and plaintiff havt> sPt forth l! 
contentions with respect to those issues. There is no d1S[•-lc 
as to the evidentiary facts presented by the parties in suppor'. 
of their respective positions and plaintiff has pointed out 
crucial areas in which no supporting evidence has been pre-
sented or referred to. 
From the evidence in the record and from the absence 
in the record of other required supporting evidence, plaintiff 
believes the following conclusions to be inescapable under 
established Utah Workmen's Compensation law: 
1. There is no inference or presumption of compens-
ability applicable to the circumstances of this case; 
2. Claimant has the burden of proof to establish the 
compensability of decedent's death at the No. 9 settling tank; 
3. Claimant must establish as a crucial requirernenl 
of compensability a causal connection between decedent's death 
at the No. 9 settling tank and his employment duties, direct 2! 
incidental; 
4. There is no evidence in the record to support a 
finding that decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling tank wac 
"incidental" to his employment duties with plaintiff under thE 
principles set forth in Hafer' s case or that it was "one "' 
those things which it should reasonably be expected an emplo1e• 
-18-
,,,, in connection with those [work) duties• under the 
"I the decision of this court; in fact plain-
specifically negates such a finding; 
,-
.;, The only reasonable conclusion from the evidence 
in tt1e record is that decedent's death at the No. 9 settling 
:a:ik was not causally related to his employment duties; 
6. The Industrial Commission's award of benefits 
er:tered on November 18, 1982, and affirmed by the Commission 
cet;ruary 2, 1983, was contrary to law and should be set aside 
rn its entirety. 
Defendant has urged application of the recognized rule 
r.f construction which resolves any doubt regarding compensation 
in favor of recovery. Such rule should not apply, however, 
'<here to do so would mean to ignore the compensability require-
ments of the statute and the burden of proof principles so well 
ostabl1shed by this Court in the interpretation of the Utah 
·•orKmen's Compensation Act. See J & W Janitorial case, supra, 
where the Court found, as plaintiff here contends, that the 
snly reasonable conclusion from the evidence in the record was 
that decedent was not killed in an accident which arose out of 
or in the course of his employment. (661 P.2d at 951). 
With respect to Workmen's Compensation statutory 
,,,,.struction, the employer's position is represented by lan-
this Court in Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
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Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980), which is parlicuJ,"' 
applicable to this case: 
The statute must also be considered from the 
standpoint of the employer. The Workmen's 
Compensation Act imposes liability upon him 
regardless of fault; and, as in all statutes 
which impose burdens for responsibilities 
upon a person, one is entitled to rely on a 
strict application of the statute as to the 
extent of his responsibility. 
To sustain the defendant's position and the Industrial 
Commission's award would, in effect, make plaintiff the insurer 
of all injuries to or death of its employees occurring on its 
premises during the hours of employment. The Utah Act neither 
requires nor suggests any such result particularly where, as 
here, the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence in the 
record is that decedent's death was not causally related to his 
employment duties. th 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ..--day of July, 1983. 
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